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Save Ourselves: The Environmental Case That 
Changed Louisiana 
Oliver A. Houck* 
You can drive the interstate from New Orleans to Baton 
Rouge, Louisiana in about an hour, or you might take the River 
Road. In that same hour’s time you will emerge from cane fields 
and chemical plants into the town of Burnside; its stores, a school, 
and a row of frame houses. Out across the way is an old slave 
quarters converted to a restaurant called The Cabin and run by a 
family named Robert. But for the Roberts, you would also be 
driving by the largest hazardous waste disposal facility in the state, 
perhaps the country. Or, as the Governor claimed, the world. 
The Roberts were alarmed by the prospect. With a friend, a 
retired nurse, they formed a small group called Save Ourselves. 
Because, as they saw it, no one else would. Many years later, after 
a journey that seemed several times to leave them dead by the 
roadside, the case of Save Ourselves would make Louisiana legal 
history and revolutionize environmental decision making in the 
state.1 The landscape would never be the same. 
Nothing in the Save Ourselves outcome was foreordained. The 
odds for winning were slim. The odds of making new law were 
beyond imagination. Had this case not occurred, it is doubtful that 
another would have come along to replicate it. The Save Ourselves 
opinion arose from disparate sources, each of them human, each 
operating on its own logic, up to a massive and prolonged 
collision. 
We could, of course, continue to read and practice law 
effectively without knowing anything about Save Ourselves other 
than the requirements it left behind and mark its passage. We 
would be much the poorer, however, because the story of this case 
says so much about Louisiana’s difficult marriage with the notion 
of environmental protection and what it takes for this protection, 
even today, to work. At bottom it requires people, which is where 
this story begins. 
 
 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2012, by OLIVER A. HOUCK. 
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 1. Save Ourselves v. La. Envtl. Control Comm’n, 452 So. 2d 1152 (La. 
1984). 
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I. THE CALL 
It started with a telephone call from Ruby Cointment, an old 
friend, who had been reading the morning paper.2 Theresa Robert, 
a 26-year-old housewife with a house trailer to keep, a small 
restaurant to run, and a three-year-old loose on the floor did not 
have time for the paper, but she could tuck the telephone receiver 
under her ear and keep on with the dishes. “Honey,” she asked, 
“they going to do what?” Ruby said, “they going to build a toxic 
waste dump by you, barges coming in off the river and all.” She 
paused, reading ahead, and then added, “it’s going to be the biggest 
in the world.”3 
Ascension Parish lies south of Baton Rouge along the 
Mississippi River, its landscape capturing Louisiana’s transition 
from a plantation economy to a new one based on oil, gas, and 
chemicals. At their peak, columned dwellings in all shapes and 
colors lined the river from the capital city to New Orleans, a grand 
promenade for the steamboats passing by.4 The Civil War, 
however, broke the back of the sugar economy. By the end of the 
war, the number of plantations had dropped from 1,400 to less than 
200, most of these on the road to decay.5 One hundred years later 
the best living examples  still standing—Tezcuco, Houmas House, 
San Francisco, Nottoway—were found in and around Ascension, 
shoulder to shoulder with chemical plants and oil refineries, a new 
kind of plantation culture that made the air smell funny from time 
to time and left dead fish on the surface of bayou waters. Slowly 
and unwillingly, a state deeply dependent on petrochemicals began 
recognizing that their byproducts were dangerous and that 
dumping them wherever convenient was not a good solution. With 
this recognition, however, came a golden prospect. 
                                                                                                             
 2. Interview by Claire Yancey, with Theresa Robert, Al Robert, and Al 
Robert, Jr. in Burnside, La. (October 23, 2008) [hereinafter Robert Interview]. 
The quotations that follow are taken from this interview. 
 3. See Sonny Albarado & Penny Perkins, Waste Unit Set on Site for 
Airport, MORNING ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), Oct. 18, 1979, at 1-B 
(“Ascension Parish Police Jury President Vincent ‘Cy’ Tortorich Responded 
with a shocked ‘What!’ when told Wednesday that property his parish and East 
Baton Rouge Parish were considering for an airport location will be used instead 
for the world’s largest chemical waste treatment complex.”). 
 4. The River Road, WWW.NPS.GOV, http://www.nps.gov/nr/travel/louisiana/ 
riverroad.htm. (last visited March 19, 2011). 
 5. John McQuaid, Transforming the Land, TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 21, 
2000, http://www.nola.com/speced/unwelcome/index.ssf?/speced/unwelcome/ 
stories/0521transforming.html; Mary Gehman, Touring Louisiana’s Great River 
Road, available at http://margaretmedia.dawesbiz.net/river_road/intro.htm (last 
visited April 12, 2011). 
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The problem was pressing. U.S. industries in the early 1980s 
were generating around 600 billion pounds of hazardous waste 
each year—roughly one million pounds per minute.6 The State of 
Louisiana, 31st of the states in size, led the nation in hazardous 
waste production,7 with over 16,000 pounds for every person in the 
state—much of it discharged directly into the river or in open pits 
and underground cavities, eventually finding its way into local 
wells, swamps and streams. At the time the Save Ourselves lawsuit 
was coming on, there were close to 3,000 water discharge permits 
for 183 million tons of waste a year in Louisiana, most of it into 
the Mississippi River below Baton Rouge, the drinking water 
source for nearly 1.5 million people.8 Jefferson Parish estimated 
that over 213 million pounds of 50 different toxic chemicals passed 
by its water intake pipes each year.9 The contamination of the New 
Orleans water supply became so notorious that it prompted passage 
of the federal Safe Drinking Water Act.10 Researchers at the time 
also noted striking correlations between consumers of Mississippi 
water and certain forms of cancer, including rectal cancer, which 
they explained by the rectum’s function in the resorption of 
water.11 The chemical industry denied any connection.12 
                                                                                                             
 6. PAT COSTNER & JOE THORNTON, WE ALL LIVE DOWNSTREAM: THE 
MISSISSIPPI RIVER AND THE NATIONAL TOXICS CRISIS, 91 (1989). 
 7. Id. As of 2008, Louisiana was ranked first in the nation for the quantity 
of hazardous waste produced, and 15th in the total number of hazardous waste 
producers. AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR CIVIL ENGINEERS, Report Card for 
America’s Future, Louisiana, http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/state-
page/louisiana (last visited Oct. 18, 2011). 
 8. See COSTNER & THORNTON, supra note 6, at 91. 
 9. Id. at 93. 
 10. JAMES L. AGEE, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PROTECTING AMERICA'S 
DRINKING WATER: OUR RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE SAFE DRINKING WATER 
ACT (1975), available at http://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/history/topics/sdwa/ 
07.html. Environmental Protection Agency studies in the 1970s found, 
respectively, 46 and 66 toxic and potentially toxic chemicals in New Orleans 
and regional water supplies, while another survey found such high risk toxins as 
carbon tetrachloride, chloroform, benzene, trichloroethylene and bromoform. 
See Oliver Houck, This Side of Heresy: Conditioning Louisiana’s Ten-Year 
Industrial Tax Exemption Upon Compliance with Environmental Laws, 61 TUL. 
L. REV. 289, 314 (1986) (citing ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DRAFT ANALYTIC 
REPORT: NEW ORLEANS AS A WATER SUPPLY STUDY (1974) and ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF SUSPECTED CARCINOGENS IN DRINKING 
WATER: REPORT TO CONGRESS (1975)).  
 11. See Houck, supra note 10, at 315–316 (citing GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE 
ON ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH, ENVIRONMENT AND HEALTH IN LOUISIANA: THE 
CANCER PROBLEM 165–66 (1984); Cancer Risk Higher From Drinking River 
Water, Study Shows, MORNING ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), Apr. 25, 1985 
(Supp.) (Prosperity in Paradise? Louisiana’s Chemical Legacy) at 10, col. 1; 
Interview with Dr. Marise Gottlieb, Tulane University (Apr. 2, 1986)). 
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Hazardous waste landfill disposal in the state was also 
booming, with nearly one-third of the nation’s storage capacity 
held in open lagoons, spread onto the land or injected into 
underground wells, where it by and large went off the radar.13 
Fewer than half of Louisiana’s 3,000 injection wells had ever been 
inspected, and the inspections that did occur showed widespread 
problems.14 State officials were unable even to “venture a guess” at 
the volume of oilfield waste injections, which were but one slice of 
the pie.15 To this leviathan one could add nearly 200 chemical 
waste pits on private industrial sites, another 20,000 “non 
hazardous” oilfield pits, and rampant “midnight” dumping.16 As a 
state official in that era observed, “all it took was a backhoe.”17 
All of which is to say that Louisiana, its popular governor, 
Edwin Edwards, and Ascension Parish had a bona fide problem on 
their hands. For the Governor, it was all opportunity. The state 
could develop the capacity not only to manage its own wastes but 
to provide this service to the nation as well.18 It would be a virtual 
                                                                                                             
 
 12. Industry, Cancer Link Unproved, MORNING ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), 
Apr. 25, 1985 (Supp.) (Prosperity in Paradise? Louisiana’s Chemical Legacy) 
at 8, col. 1 (quoting Fred Loy, President of the Louisiana Chemical Association, 
saying “I’m tired of having to address the issue of cancer and the chemical 
industry, when there is no evidence that they are related.”). 
 13. R.D. Bullard, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
QUALITY, 66 (1990); Jason Berry, The Poisoning of Louisiana, SOUTHERN 
EXPOSURE, Mar.–Apr. 1984, at 16–17 (“With 80 waste injection wells, 
Louisiana has roughly 25 percent of all such wells in the United States.”). 
 14. See Houck, supra note 10, at 324 (citing Well Testers Overwhelmed, 
MORNING ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), Apr. 25, 1985 (Supp.) (Prosperity in 
Paradise? Louisiana’s Chemical Legacy) at 15 (of approximately 3,000 
injection well for wastes of all types, only half had been inspected and, of those, 
some thirty percent had problems)). 
 15. Id. at 325. 
 16. State Faces Groundwater Problems, MORNING ADVOCATE, Apr. 25, 
1985 (Supp.) (Prosperity in Paradise? Louisiana’s Chemical Legacy) at 14, col. 
1; Houck, supra note 10, at 326 (citing Loopholes Mask Groundwater Problems, 
MORNING ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), Apr. 25, 1985 (Supp.) (Prosperity in 
Paradise? Louisiana’s Chemical Legacy) at 15, col. 1; Judice, Hearing Monday 
on Oilfield Waste Rules, TIMES-PICAYUNE/STATES-ITEM, Aug. 3, 1985, at B-1, 
col. 2.). 
 17. Undiscovered Waste Sites Pose Threat to Water, MORNING ADVOCATE 
(Baton Rouge), Apr. 25, 1985 (Supp.) (Prosperity in Paradise? Louisiana’s 
Chemical Legacy) at 19, col. 1. A representative of the Office of Conservation 
states: “We know it’s happening because we keep catching people.” Id. (quoting 
Carroll Wascom, Office of Conservation). 
 18. Interview with Edmund (“Judge”) Reggie in New Orleans, La. (August, 
1982); Stella Pitts, Waste Plant Opposed by Ascension Group, MORNING 
ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), Oct. 18, 1979 (on file with author). 
2012] SAVE OURSELVES 413 
 
 
 
captive market; waste production was booming and there was no 
place for it to go. Louisiana was already importing over 100,000 
tons of toxic residuals from other states.19 We simply needed to 
corral the parade. 
Governor Edwards did nothing by halves. He wanted a national 
player to lead this initiative and sent Secretary of Natural 
Resources Jim Hutchinson to a waste conference in California, 
where he met representatives from the I.T. corporation and they 
apparently struck it off at once.20 I.T. had been created a few years 
earlier as a waste cleanup operation but had expanded quickly into 
several disposal plants in California.21 It had a reputation in the 
field. That was good enough for Hutchinson. The Governor had 
found his operator. 
II. THE COMING STORM 
The Roberts were not looking for a fight. They had, in fact, just 
finished with a bruising episode in which Theresa’s cousin Shelby 
had proposed to sell neighboring property for an Ascension Parish 
airport, with the existing Baton Rouge airport only 30 minutes up 
the highway.22 Approved by the parish police jury, the proposal 
was eventually defeated by a referendum, leaving family and 
community scars all along the way.23 Now came this proposal, and 
of all things it was cousin Shelby again proposing to sell the same 
land for the world’s largest waste dump.24 This was Theresa’s 
home, the old slave quarters she and her husband had patiently 
restored into a small restaurant, the place she was raising her 
children. She saw no choice. 
Ruby Cointment, for her part, had been a nurse at the cancer 
center M.D. Anderson in Houston for many years and had seen 
what she believed to be too many Louisiana children with strange 
                                                                                                             
 19. Bullard, supra note 13, at 66 
 20. Al Robert, Jr., The “IT Decision”, LA. ENVTL. LAWYER, Summer 2004, 
at 2 (citing D. Eric Bookhardt, A Magnet for Toxic Wastes, FIGARO 
NEWSMAGAZINE, Mar. 17, 1980, at 5–6). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Robert Interview, supra note 2. 
 23. Albarado & Perkins, supra note 3, at 1-B. 
 24. Interview by Claire Yancey with William Fontenot, former member of 
the Louisiana Attorney General’s Office, in Baton Rouge, La. (Sept. 21, 2008) 
[hereinafter Fontenot Interview]. Mr. Fontenot worked with the Roberts and 
other Louisiana citizens on access to information, law and other services relating 
to environmental quality.  
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ailments.25 The I.T. proposal brought these children back to mind, 
which is why she had called Theresa that morning. Theresa had 
two youngsters and a third on the way. 
Neither of the women were “environmentalists.”26 Theresa 
Robert professed not to have yet heard the word.  Further, she had 
not even known the plants nearby had hazardous wastes before she 
got involved.27 The oil, gas, and chemical industry supported the 
little town of Burnside as it did the entire parish. Its workers 
constituted most of her customers at The Cabin. Theresa’s father 
had worked as a supervisor for the Agrico fertilizer plant across the 
river in Donaldsonville, and her husband and his family owned a 
fuel distributorship that ran between the Texaco refinery and local 
gas stations.28 Ruby’s husband did survey work for plants up and 
down the river.29 They were industry people.30 But the I.T. 
proposal was different. 
Looking around, they discovered that at least eight major 
hazardous waste disposal facilities were already in operation along 
the river in Ascension Parish, a small rectangle of about ten miles 
by thirty.31 Three abandoned chemical dumps in the area had made 
the state’s Superfund list for priority cleanup, the most serious of 
the known super-problems.32 To Louisiana officials, the Burnside 
location was logical—a lightly populated area in obvious need of 
hazardous waste disposal. To the Roberts, however, the location 
could not be more insensitive. It was within a mile of their town, 
and two miles from a predominantly black school with 233 
students from kindergarten through eighth grade.33 The facility 
would, furthermore, sit on top of a former Houma Indian Nation 
village and within a stone’s throw of three registered national 
landmarks including the St. Joseph’s School House, one of the first 
                                                                                                             
 25. Robert Interview, supra note 2 (“She saw the children from Louisiana . . . 
she just always thought there was more children from Louisiana there than other 
states, and it really concerned her.”). 
 26. Id. (“The environmentalists were people that didn’t wash their hair, and 
they came in with babies on their backs, and sandals and barefooted.”).  
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Fontenot Interview, supra note 24. 
 30. Robert Interview, supra note 2 (“Industry put food on my table; industry 
took care of my family.”). 
 31. Id.  
 32. COSTNER & THORNTON, supra note 6 at 42. 
 33. Stella Pitts, Purified wastes, or poison water? Disposal plant fighting 
rages on, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Mar. 1, 1981, at 1-1 (on file with author) (Noting 
that Ascension Parish contains “three of the state’s most serious hazardous 
waste disposal sites.”). 
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Catholic schools in Louisiana established for people of color.34 The 
147-year-old Tezcuco plantation with a dozen small cottages, two 
museums, chapel and collection of 200-year-old oak trees was one 
of the last remaining crown jewels of its culture.35 The Houmas 
House Plantation felt so threatened that it participated actively in 
the hearings to come and supported the Roberts in their legal 
actions.36 As Theresa Robert, Ruby Cointment and an increasing 
number of locals saw it, the I.T. proposal was not a solution; it was 
an assault. 
National news at the time was not comforting. Grim reports 
came from Love Canal in upper New York State, where thousands 
of tons of toxins were found beneath a suburban neighborhood, 
soon followed by scandals at Woburn, Massachusetts and 
Kentucky’s Valley of the Drums.37 An equally dark report came 
from Bayou Sorrel on just the other side of the Mississippi, where 
a young man named Curly Jackson opened the cock valve on a 
tanker full of hydrogen sulfide gas and was killed on the spot.38 
The toxins in Jackson’s blood levels reached 3000 parts per 
million.39 The Governor and the parish sheriff had claimed that he 
probably died of carbon monoxide instead.40 The press had a field 
day. Hazardous waste was not looking like a friendly neighbor. 
                                                                                                             
 34. Historic school struck from national register, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 
26, 2011. 
 35. Dorothy Mahan, People Power: Two Homemakers Win Landmark 
Environmental Decision, PRESERVATION IN PRINT, Dec. 1992, at 16; Historic 
School Struck From National Register, SHREVEPORT TIMES, Feb. 26, 2011, 
http://www.shreveporttimes.com/article/20110227/NEWS01/102270319/Histori
c-school-struck-from-national-register. 
 36. Stella Pitts, Houmas House neighbor upsets residents, MORNING 
ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), Mar. 1, 1981 (quoting Houmas House owner Edwin 
Paul Crozat, who said “Our only hope is in the courts.”) (on file with author); 
Sonny Albarado, Dispute almost halts waste permit hearing, MORNING 
ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), at 1-B (on file with author). The Plantation also 
provided funding for key expert witnesses. Interview by Claire Yancey with 
Steve Irving in Baton Rouge, La. (November 21, 2008) [hereinafter Irving 
Interview]. 
 37. See Sam Howe Verhovek, After 10 Years, the Trauma of Love Canal 
Continues, N.Y. TIMES, August 5, 1988, http://www.nytimes.com/1988/08/05/ 
nyregion/after-10-years-the-trauma-of-love-canal-continues.html; JONATHAN 
HARR, A CIVIL ACTION (1996); James Bruggers, Toxic Legacy Revisited: Valley 
of the Drums 30 Years Later, COURIER-JOURNAL, December 14, 2008, 
http://www.courier-journal.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20081214/NEWS 
01/81214001/Toxic-legacy-revisited-Valley-Drums-30-years-later. 
 38. Fontenot interview, supra note 24. 
 39. Id; see also Rollins Envtl. Services of La., Inc. v. Iberville Parish Police 
Jury, 371 So. 2d 1127 (La. 1979) (holding parish ordinance passed in response 
to Curly Jackson’s death unconstitutional). 
 40. Fontenot Interview, supra note 24. 
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That said, Theresa and Ruby were, at the time, an army of only 
two, and that was not going to suffice. They called a small meeting 
of friends. Not that many people could fit into the trailer, but one 
who did was Willie Fontenot, a member of the state Attorney 
General’s office with the portfolio to help local groups and citizens 
understand their rights and the workings of the law.41 Quiet, low-
key, never pretending to be an expert in law or science, Fontenot 
had attended community meetings around the state for more than 
two decades, advising people how to get the information they 
needed, make requests of agencies, approach legislators, find 
experts, and speak at public hearings.42 For all the things that 
private corporations hire law firms to do, while writing off their 
bills as routine business expenditures, Fontenot was the only public 
counterpart—a resource for hundreds of Louisianans sitting at 
some point in their own kitchens with no financial backing, no 
access to lawyers, and facing a project they found overwhelming. 
Fontenot sat in the Roberts trailer on that evening, listening to 
the rise and fall of the conversation.43 When all had had their say, 
he told them that they had the right to find out what was going on 
for themselves. They would want to organize themselves, starting 
with a name. Theresa and Ruby settled on “Save Ourselves” 
because, as they later explained, “if we didn’t, nobody else was 
going to.”44 They had no idea how great the odds were against 
them doing any such thing. 
III. THE STATE STUDY 
The state wanted to fast track the I.T. proposal. The quicker the 
approval, the less time for querulous outsiders to muddy the 
waters. Besides, the federal government, also awakening late to the 
phenomenon of widespread hazardous waste, had passed a national 
law imposing strict new requirements on treatment and storage 
facilities.45 An early state approval could beat the start date for 
these new burdens. The Department of Natural Resources asked 
for a legislative resolution waiving state bid laws and allowing it to 
                                                                                                             
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. For a fuller description of Mr. Fontenot’s role, see BARBARA L. 
ALLEN, UNEASY ALCHEMY: CITIZENS AND EXPERTS IN LOUISIANA’S CHEMICAL 
CORRIDOR DISPUTES (2003). 
 43. Allen, supra note 42, at 38. 
 44. Robert Interview, supra note 2. 
 45. Mahan, supra note 35, at 16. 
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sole-source contract a waste management feasibility study.46 
Unfortunately for I.T., the resolution failed. No matter, it was easy 
enough to rig the selection process and, barring the unforeseen, 
there was still time to beat the federal timeline. 
The study was a Louisiana hayride. I.T., which the Department 
had discovered in California, was invited to bid. Although it 
submitted the second highest bid in the solicitation,47 won the 
award of $385,000, apparently on the recommendation of a 
consulting firm called Research Associates of Louisiana, which 
was working closely with the Department on hazardous waste 
issues.48 Indeed, it was directing them. As a later Ethics 
Commission would report, Research Associates was 
“fundamentally and comprehensively involved, virtually to the 
exclusion of the other Department of Natural Resources staff, in 
the development and management of the Department’s fledgling 
‘Hazardous Waste Disposal Management Program.’”49 This 
presented no particular ethical issues, but then I.T. sub-contracted 
with the same firm, Research Associates, to conduct its feasibility 
study as well.50 At which point, Research Associates was in the 
enviable position of reviewing its own work when it came to the 
Department for approval. 
The Hayride did not stop there. While the study was under 
way, I.T. was negotiating with Shelby Robert for the purchase of 
the Burnside tract, and had executed an option to purchase the tract 
within a week of presenting its feasibility study to the state.51 Lo 
and behold, the feasibility study concluded that a single, mega-
facility was needed for Ascension Parish and that the Burnside 
property was ideal in all characteristics for its location. At this 
point, I.T. had, in effect, sole-sourced not only the feasibility study 
but also the selection of its own project at its own site. 
                                                                                                             
 46. See Sonny Albarado, IT battling Nov. 19 deadline for Permit, MORNING 
ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), Oct. 30, 1980 (on file with author); see also 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1976). 
 47. Albarado, supra note 48 (quoting an I.T. official as stating “‘we 
anticipated having a permit (from Louisiana) sooner than this . . . It’s quite 
important from an economic standpoint.’”). Federal law would not only delay 
the project but also likely bring more stringent safety conditions, such as plant 
modifications and storage pit liners. Id. 
 48. Robert, supra note 20, at 3. 
 49. I.T. Corp. v. Comm’n on Ethics for Public Emps., 453 So. 2d 251, 258 
(La. Ct. App. 1st 1984). 
 50. See I.T. Corp., 453 So. 2d at 252–53. 
 51. Id. at 258. 
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I.T. would eventually purchase the land for $1.45 million.52 
Shelby Robert, who reportedly had paid $450,000 for it some years 
earlier, apparently realized a million-dollar profit. His attorney, 
Vincent Sotile, a close associate of Governor Edwards, was often 
reported as, and later convicted of, having his own hand in such 
arrangements.53 A few years later, Mr. Sotile went to federal prison 
for attempting to bribe a federal judge in another waste 
management lawsuit in Morgan City.54 The Hayride continued.  
None of these revelations, which would wind their way up to 
the Louisiana Ethics Commission and the state Supreme Court, 
turned out to be significant obstacles for the I.T.’s Burnside 
project. At the time Save Ourselves was forming, these 
indiscretions were not even known. As things turned out, however, 
the indiscretions played their role. 
IV. THE LEARNING CURVE 
The first step for Save Ourselves was simply to find out what 
was going on. Theresa, Ruby, and a few others began attending 
police jury and public meetings on the proposal, which seemed 
larger each time: an $85 million dollar facility spread out over 
1,000 acres with its own loading dock and road up from the river, a 
new form of plantation in itself.55 Feelings of the Ascension Policy 
Jury were mixed. Some members feared the parish would be 
“transformed into an industrial wasteland for the nation,”56 while 
others saw a new mega-facility as a way, given the existing range 
of dump sites already at hand, to “kind of clear up our situation.”57 
None of them, however, liked having the proposal sprung on them 
by surprise, the first of several tactical errors I.T. would make 
along the way.58 
As for the State and I.T., they viewed public involvement the 
same way: an animal best kept at bay. The only two potential 
difficulties with the proposal noted in the IT/Research 
Associates/DNR feasibility report were “public opposition and 
permit delays”.59 “If we give locals a vote,” a DNR environmental 
                                                                                                             
 52. I.T. Corp. v. Comm’n on Ethics for Public Emps., 464 So. 2d 284, 287 
(La. 1985). 
 53. See I.T. Corp., 453 So. 2d at 257. 
 54. Fontenot Interview, supra note 24. 
 55. See Alan Sayre, Baton Rouge Judge Asks Not to be Censured, TIMES-
PICAYUNE, Apr. 15, 1995. 
 56. Pitts, supra note 18. 
 57. Albarado and Perkins, supra note 3, at 14-B. 
 58. Pitts, supra note 18. 
 59. Albarado and Perkins, supra note 3, at 1-B. 
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official said, “we’ll never find a place for it.”60 I.T.’s Vice 
President labeled the nascent Save Ourselves as “a small, vocal 
minority who are simply unwilling to understand what we are 
trying to do,” concluding “the people are just going to have to trust 
us.”61 
The more Save Ourselves looked at I.T.’s operation, the less 
trustworthy it seemed. For one thing, it was a moving target; the 
company appeared to be making up the project as it went along. 
An early description stated that it would dump an estimated 
800,000 gallons of treated waste into the river daily, an amount 
I.T. assured would pose no threat to the area’s drinking water.62 
When local citizens objected that the discharge point was less than 
a mile upstream from the intake pipe for some 4,000 parish 
residents,63 the treatment focus switched to something called “land 
farming,”64 which Al Robert remembers thinking was some form 
of agriculture.65 It was not. Rather, it turned out to consist of 
spreading the wastes out across the adjacent farmland (explaining 
the need for a 1,000-acre site), where it would presumably dry out 
and disappear.66 Not surprisingly, people asked what happened 
when it rained, because the area was prone to heavy precipitation 
and annual floods.67 At this point, land farming, too, dropped out 
of the discussion. 
Instead, I.T. proposed to bind the hazardous waste in a kind of 
cement, which could then be safely buried and forgotten.68 This is 
where the corporation made another tactical error. It had been 
dealing with a company called Chemfix in Jefferson Parish for this 
process, a company apparently well connected with Jefferson 
politicians who, in consequence, were naturally inclined to support 
the I.T. proposal.69 I.T., however, apparently found a less 
expensive process called Surefix, leaving Chemfix out in the cold. 
The decision was doubtlessly logical to corporate officials in San 
Francisco, but, locally, the loss of Jefferson Parish support left 
Ascension, poor sister to its wealthier neighbor, to its own devices 
as more and more troubling questions poured in. There were 
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 67. Irving Interview, supra note 36. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. The description of the Chemfix process and its connection to 
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suspicions that groundwater under the site connected with the 
Mississippi River. There were rumors that I.T. had experienced 
problems in California. I.T. then indicated that it would burn at 
least some of the waste in an incinerator.70 
Facing skepticism, I.T. invited a small delegation, at its own 
expense, to visit its California facilities and see for themselves.71 
The invitation included Theresa and Al Robert of Save Ourselves, 
who agreed to go along but, despite the financial strain, insisted on 
paying their own way.72 
The trip was a revelation. While Louisiana officials on the 
delegation enjoyed meetings with their counterparts and trips to 
wineries, the Roberts spent four days at the I.T. San Francisco bay 
area facility. They interviewed neighbors, largely poor workers of 
Mexican descent, and then the mayor and members of the area air 
quality management district, who had rather distinct views.  Al 
Robert later described the plant as a “big joke.” Its state-of-the-art 
technology consisted of the same “land farming” technique 
proposed for Burnside, plus an incinerator “no bigger than the one 
behind the local Food Mart and buildings recently spray painted 
with aluminum paint,” apparently to make them appear modern. Al 
decided to rent a car and tour the facility on his own, down 
unpaved roads that the tour bus did not attempt, leaving a pregnant 
Theresa behind, at the advice of local residents. He discovered 
open pits with standing water and ponds overflowing with waste. 
The stench was “unbearable.” 
The interview with the air management district was no more 
encouraging. The facility was “a nightmare,” they said, with pages 
of reported violations and lengthy court battles against I.T. Local 
news articles revealed that two of the evaporation ponds had been 
shut down following a year of odor complaints that resulted in an 
administrative hearing and an injunction against dumping any toxic 
chemicals.73 A district inspector told Theresa that a waste 
                                                                                                             
 70. Id; see also Robert interview, supra note 2 (incineration proposal). 
 71. Sonny Albarado, Area Group Still Opposes Waste Facility, MORNING 
ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), June 7, 1980 (on file with author). 
 72. Robert Interview, supra note 2. The description of the Robert trip that 
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criteria for establishment of a hazardous waste facility. The Board ordered the 
closure of the site for hazardous materials and it was converted to a sanitary 
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operation of this type would need a “tremendous amount of 
watchdog activity,” and some “real valid enforcement” at the local 
level.74 This one California district had 170 air quality employees; 
Louisiana had 30 for the entire state.75 
Nonetheless, Louisiana and Ascension Parish officials returned 
with their minds unchanged. I.T. had experienced some problems, 
they agreed, but largely in the past. Save Ourselves was going to 
have to raise its concerns to another level, and that would require a 
lawyer. At which point the Roberts met Steve Irving, whom they 
later characterized as “a gift from God.”76 
V. THE PRECEDENT 
Jurisprudence is not produced by spontaneous combustion. It is 
all about context, and just as human beings are shaped by their 
surroundings so are legal decisions, great and small. The Save 
Ourselves litigation arose from a series of very difficult lawsuits, 
each approaching the same, burgeoning hazardous waste 
phenomenon in Louisiana in a different way. 
The first case involved an attempt by Iberville Parish, across 
the Mississippi River from Ascension, to curtail toxic waste flow 
into the community. The police jury began in l975 with an 
ordinance prohibiting a local hauler for residential and commercial 
customers from disposing of hazardous wastes.77 Three years later, 
Rollins Environmental Services bought a deep-well injection 
facility from an outfit known as “CLAW” (Clean Land and Water) 
along Bayou Sorrell for the disposal of industrial chemicals.78 A 
month later, Curly Jackson died at an illegal dump site also 
operated by CLAW, at which point Iberville amended its existing 
ordinance to ban all toxic waste disposal in the parish.79 The 
Louisiana Supreme Court would have none of it, declaring in a 
1979 opinion—just as the “world’s largest waste facility” was 
announced for Ascension Parish—that a recent state waste 
management law had preempted the field and that Louisiana’s 
“prominent position” as one of the Nation’s “foremost producers” 
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of toxic wastes “crie[d] out against the prospect” of local 
prohibitions.80 Overlooking the Court’s apparent enthusiasm for 
the state’s leadership in toxic waste production, the practical effect 
of the opinion was to relegate Louisiana parishes to an advisory 
role. As the I.T. case came on, Save Ourselves would have to look 
beyond the parish authority. 
Also in the early l970s, a Petro Processors waste facility came 
under fire in East Baton Rouge Parish, just north of Ascension; 
large, open pits at the property boundary were leaking onto 
neighboring lands that included cattle fields and the formerly 
pristine Devil’s Swamp.81 The neighbors, the Ewell family, found 
their soils saturated with a suite of chlorinated hydrocarbons: toxic, 
bio-accumulative chemicals. They brought a civil case for 
restoration of their land, estimated to cost over $170 million.82 
Although the source of the contamination was virtually 
uncontested, the extent of it was muddied at trial, and the jury 
awarded a small fraction of the requested amount, $30,000, barely 
covering plaintiff’s costs in bringing the case.83 Although the 
award was increased to $200,000 on appeal, no cleanup was 
ordered.84 Further attempts to secure it also failed.85 The lesson of 
the Petro Processors litigation was that civil actions were unlikely 
to remedy a hazardous waste problem once it was discovered. 
Citizens at risk of exposure needed to intervene at the front end. 
This lesson was brought home in yet another set of cases, 
arising again in East Baton Rouge and, coincidentally, against the 
same Rollins Environmental Services that had emerged victorious 
from the Iberville litigation.86 The waste facility this time was an 
active one, and relied on the now familiar practice of “land 
farming” and incineration.87 The effects of this operation on a 
predominantly black neighborhood were similar to those described 
by the Mexican neighbors of I.T.’s facility in California. Mary 
McCastle, a 72-year-old grandmother and leader of the Rollins 
fight, said: 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 80. Id. at 1132. 
 81. Ewell v. Petro Processors of La., Inc., 364 So. 2d 604, 605 (La. Ct. App. 
1st 1978). 
 82. Id. at 608. 
 83. Id. at 604. 
 84. Id. at 609. 
 85. See Ewell v. Petro Processors of La., Inc., 752 So. 2d 151 (La. 2000) 
(denial of writs). 
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We had no warning Rollins was coming in here. When they 
did come in we didn’t know what they were dumping. We 
did know that it was making us sick. People used to have 
nice gardens and fruit trees. They lived off their gardens 
and only had to buy meat. Some of us raised hogs and 
chickens. But not after Rollins came in. Our gardens and 
animals were dying out. Some days the odors from the 
plant would be nearly unbearable. We didn’t know what 
was causing it. We later found out that Rollins was burning 
hazardous waste.88 
McCastle and her neighbors sued as a class action, claiming 
similar injuries from a similar cause. The district and appellate 
courts accepted the company’s arguments that each injury was 
different and presented different medical issues. As a result, the 
cases would have to be tried individually.89 In the course of these 
proceedings, however, poor and minority neighbors were finding 
their voices. Black people were coming to the hearings in busses.90 
The Louisiana environmental justice movement was being born. 
At this point, three things important to Save Ourselves 
occurred. The first was a reversal by the Louisiana Supreme Court 
of the McCastle cases, finding that the plaintiffs were in fact 
similarly injured, by a single defendant, and that the rest was mere 
distraction.91 The author of the opinion was Justice James Dennis. 
It was his first environmental decision. His opinion in Save 
Ourselves would follow that same year.92 The second occurrence 
was the emergence of McCastle’s trial attorney, Steve Irving, who 
had already entered the I.T. fray for Theresa Robert and Ruby 
Cointment. The third was that Save Ourselves members began to 
attend the lengthy and contentious state hearings over Petro 
Processors and the Rollins facility, educating themselves and 
comparing notes.93 There were poignant moments. At one point, 
reading from her diary about dying cattle and dead crawfish ponds, 
Catherine Ewell lost her voice and a representative from the 
Department of Commerce and Industry got up and poured her a 
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glass of water.94 Whether this gesture is better viewed as heartfelt 
or tactical, McCastle, Ewell, and Robert et al. were having an 
emotional impact and imperceptibly changing the character of the 
game. 
In the end, the McCastle plaintiffs, ground down by years of 
litigation, accepted a settlement offering each of them a few 
thousand dollars.95 It was a financial win for the hazardous waste 
industry, but at a public price. It also confirmed that civil damage 
actions, coming after the fact of the harm, were not going to catch 
this train. Save Ourselves was going to have to directly challenge 
the state and I.T. permitting process. 
VI. THE PLAYING FIELD 
Save Ourselves was facing a stacked deck. In l980, as the first 
permit hearings came on, Louisiana’s approach to environmental 
protection was still a game in motion. More than a dozen federal 
environmental laws came into effect in one heady spate between 
l970 and l976;96 nearly all legislation since has been in fine tuning 
these programs and trying to get buy-ins from the states. State 
programs, for their part, have been spotty, some outperforming the 
federal government with regularity and others resisting to the wall. 
The Pelican State started out somewhere between resistance and 
denial. Even when denial shut off free money to remediate 
abandoned and leaking hazardous waste sites, for example, 
Louisiana refused to propose them for federal cleanup lest they 
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tarnish the image of industry in the state.97 At the time that the I.T. 
hearings were in progress, an Assistant State Attorney General 
wrote that Louisiana’s clean air law was not written to be enforced. 
Rather, he said “it was in the interest of Louisiana manufacturers to 
create just enough of a state regulatory presence to keep the federal 
government out.”98 
The State’s stance toward groups like Save Ourselves, 
therefore, was not instinctually friendly. It too, however, was in 
flux. For much of the 20th century, as oil, gas, and chemical 
industries were transforming the landscape, state environmental 
responsibilities vested as an afterthought within a few agencies 
principally devoted to other missions.99 The Department of 
Wildlife and Fisheries monitored water quality, for example, 
while, anomalously, an ad hoc-looking Stream Control 
Commission set water quality standards.100 Department of Health 
officials were asked to maintain the “purity” of air quality by 
“balancing” the protection of health with “maximum employment 
and the full industrial development of the State.”101 The 
Department’s priorities were rather clear. By the mid-1970s, facing 
a wave of new national programs, it become apparent that the state 
would need to do more. 
In l974, Louisiana amended its constitution to include a new 
provision declaring that “the air and water, and the healthful, 
scenic, historic and esthetic quality of the environment shall be 
protected, conserved and replenished,” and directing the legislature 
to enact laws to this end.102 A year later the lawmakers created an 
Office of Environmental Quality within DNR.103 In l979, as news 
of the I.T. proposal was breaking, the legislature replaced the old 
                                                                                                             
 97. See Fontenot Interview, supra note 24 (when federal funding was first 
available under the “Superfund” program, the state initially declined to identify 
potential sites in order to avoid their “stigma”). 
 98. Bob Anderson, La. Air Pollution Law Said to Be Unenforceable, 
SUNDAY ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), Nov. 26, 1978, at 7-B, col. 1 (quoting 
Richard Troy, La. Assistant Att’y Gen. on Envtl. Matters). 
 99. See Charles S. McCowan, Jr., The Evolution of Environmental Law in 
Louisiana, 52 LA. L. REV. 907, 909 (1992). The description of the evolving 
Louisiana regulatory framework is largely taken from this source. By 
coincidence, Mr. McCowan represented I.T. throughout the Save Ourselves 
proceedings. 
 100. Id. at 910–11. 
 101. Id. at 911. 
 102. LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1. This article elaborated on a provision of the 
1921 Constitution declaring that the “natural resources” of the state were to be 
protected and directing the legislature to enact implementing laws. LA. CONST. 
art. IV, § 1 (amended 1974). 
 103. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36:358–59 (Supp. 2011). 
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Stream Control Commission with a similar looking and equally 
unwieldy creature, the Environmental Control Commission (ECC), 
in charge of pollution discharge permits.104 Like its predecessor, 
the Commission was governed by the heads of state agencies (e.g. 
Agriculture, Commerce and Industry, Public Works), all but one of 
whom served at the pleasure of the Governor, and each with a 
statutory mission that regularly conflicted with environmental 
protection. This was the scene when that same year, I.T., by 
legerdemain, orchestrated the approval of its own waste 
management facility in Burnside, Louisiana, subject only to 
discharge permits from the newly-created ECC. As the action 
wound forward, the ECC would be abolished and its functions 
transferred to yet another new agency, the Department of 
Environmental Quality,105 which, as it turned out, would end up 
making the final call. 
The ECC differed from its predecessor little more than in 
name. It was no friend of Save Ourselves, but it was required to 
hold hearings, and that was all Steve Irving could ask. 
VII. THE PERMIT AND ETHICS HEARINGS 
Environmental lawsuits are rarely a one-shot event. They often 
begin with administrative hearings that can range from court-like 
trials with formal rules and contested testimony to the show-up-at-
the-microphone affairs of a city planning board that basically allow 
people to blow off steam. In this case, following DNR’s 
acceptance of its proposal, I.T. had to run both gauntlets, starting 
with a public audience before the new ECC. Time was pressing, as 
the new and more stringent requirements of federal law would kick 
in within three months. 
In July of 1980, the first public hearings were held in 
Ascension Parish. More than 500 residents showed up, many 
speaking passionately against the project.106 They already suffered 
from a disproportionate burden of toxic waste. The company’s 
assurance that it would not accept wastes from out of state 
appeared to be non-binding, and if made binding by state permit, 
unconstitutional as well.107 Local citizens had difficulty 
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understanding the company’s proposal, which kept on changing, 
much less its safety assurances.108 One testified that the death of 
even one child would be unacceptable.109 Who would be willing to 
disagree? As might be expected, they made little impression on the 
corporation, which expressed surprise that “the people in Louisiana 
don’t trust their state officials,”110 nor on the DNR official in 
charge, who, with apparent candor, suggested to the press that 
local opposition would have little impact.111 True as that might 
have been with respect to the state’s decision, it overlooked the 
political impact of that first hearing. Shortly following, the 
Ascension Parish Police Jury, which had been a divided but 
reluctant backer of the project, withdrew its support.112 Five 
hundred people in a small community can make a difference. 
A few weeks later the ECC opened its formal, adjudicative 
hearing on the I.T. project, and the real show began. Save 
Ourselves’s attorney had two objectives.113 The first was to show 
that there were serious questions here and that, at the least, DNR 
had not done nearly enough to ask or answer them. Knowing that 
the cards were stacked against him and that the ECC was 
composed of some of the most powerful figures in state 
government, the other objective was to provide space for new 
information, media attention, inquiries from legislators, criticism 
from police jurors, fluctuating market conditions, and other 
investment options to slow the train down. Theresa Robert 
remained on the phone in her trailer kitchen, the high heels on her 
pumps pounding sharp circles into the floor, talking to reporters, 
arranging cookie sales, and recruiting new members. Save 
Ourselves would grow to several thousand, convinced that the 
world’s largest hazardous waste facility at Burnside was a very bad 
idea.  
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The formal hearings began in September of l980.  They would 
continue for 18 meetings before the Commission alone, with 150 
hours of testimony, over 100 exhibits, and a record that grew into 
thousands of pages, for another ten years.114 On one side were the 
Commission members, the DNR staff and some of the highest-end 
law firms I.T. could retain. On the other side was Steve Irving, in 
solo practice, with no ambitious law clerks at his command and no 
partners to pick up the slack, already over-committed to the 
McCreary case and the Rollins hearings, and with no means of 
funding even the filing of pleadings, to say nothing of fees. In 
addition to these challenges that would defeat all but the most 
committed attorney, Irving faced one more. His clients might be 
passionate about their cause, but they had no expertise. The I.T. 
issues involved chemistry, engineering, hydrology, geology, 
biology, cancer, exposure pathways and risk analysis, each one a 
mind-numbing mystery for someone trained, instead, in law. The 
permits themselves were so complicated they required training 
even to read them, much less to critique them. Irving not only 
lacked experts to gainsay the project, he did not even have 
assistants who knew what questions to ask. At this point, he 
received a gift from God. In fact, he received two of them. They 
changed all the dynamics. 
As the formal hearings began, Irving was approached by 
Bentley Mackie who was an employee of the Police Jury 
Association of Louisiana, a lobby for police juries with state and 
federal officials.115 Mackie was not only wired to state and local 
politics but also to the local hazardous waste industry, particularly 
the Chemfix proponents who had lost out with I.T. not long 
before.116 According to Irving, there were several local industries 
that saw I.T. as a rogue operator, or as unwanted competition, or 
both, and were happy to see the project challenged at the ECC. 
Mackie, pipelining technical and political expertise into the Save 
Ourselves case, became an invaluable asset in understanding the 
Chemfix process, the hazards of land farming, and the nature of 
subsurface geology that would become a critical, indeed pivotal, 
issue. With this knowledge in his corner, Irving was able to turn 
the hearings into an open discovery process, asking questions to 
which he knew the state had few if any answers, all of which 
would take time to explore and resolve. 
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This was, of course, I.T.’s greatest fear. It needed to get its 
state permits within a matter of weeks before federal law kicked in 
and complicated things enormously.117 I.T.’s most outspoken 
proponent on the Commission, the Commissioner of Agriculture 
Bob Odom, told Save Ourselves, which had just been joined by the 
antebellum plantation Houmas House, that he would brook no 
delay. “We’re not going to give you two weeks,” he warned the 
attorneys.118 Seeing, nonetheless, the process drag forward, I.T. 
came up with the idea of an “interim permit,” approving the project 
pending further review, which it hoped would satisfy the federal 
government that the facility was pre-approved and therefore 
exempted from the new federal program.119 Odom made his 
motion to the full Commission before Irving had had the 
opportunity to present his first witness, which seemed a little rough 
even by Louisiana rules.120 The Department of Wildlife and 
Fisheries representative took the unusual step of opposing the 
motion, explaining that, while he could not put his finger on the 
problem, it didn’t seem right.121 The motion lost, four to three.122 
Around this time, Irving received a tip from Mackie that Odom 
had received a $25,000 “campaign loan,” as yet unpaid, from 
Shelby Robert, who was looking forward to a handsome profit 
from the sale of his property to I.T.123 It seemed a rather obvious 
conflict of interest and Irving lost no time requesting an 
investigation by the State Ethics board.124 This created a new 
sideshow and more adverse publicity. Odom eventually defeated 
the ethics charges,125 but they left an odor that tainted both I.T. and 
the ECC. The controversy also galvanized I.T. into acting on its 
option agreement with Shelby Roberts, before the ethics 
proceedings could question it and perhaps scare him away.126 The 
company paid out its $1.45 million and took title to the property. 
As Irving saw it, I.T. made the mistake of paying its money before 
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the deal was done. Then again, at this early stage of the process, 
the deal still looked very much done; it was still only a matter of 
going through the motions. 
Then came the second act of God, another player from an 
unexpected quarter with more game-changing information.127 Dale 
Givens was a water quality specialist in DNR’s Office of the 
Environment, and later became Secretary of its successor agency, 
the Department of Environmental Quality. According to Irving, 
Givens was a military, chain-of-command man who did not like 
the fact that I.T. and Research Associates had commandeered the 
DNR waste management study and the Burnside site approval. 
Both from a sense that this was not good government and a more 
particularized sense that his department had been hijacked,128 
Givens approached Irving in confidence and disclosed first-ever 
information on the relationships between I.T., Research 
Associates, and DNR. Lacking resources to pursue it, Irving 
quickly turned over the information to an investigative reporter of 
the Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, who had a field day. 
As the details came out, Irving moved again for an inquiry by 
the State Ethics Board into the timing of I.T.’s property purchase 
while it was ostensibly studying the site’s feasibility for DNR. He 
also raised the conflicts that Research Associates presented within 
DNR itself, responsive to both I.T. and the agency.129 The more 
one looked, such coincidences of interest seemed routine. At one 
point, the I.T. permit application was supported by the report of a 
Louisiana State University geologist that found no problems with 
subsurface strata. When it turned out that this geologist was also 
working for Research Associates, which was, in turn, reviewing 
the permit, he explained he could be perfectly impartial while 
evaluating his own work.130 The notion of conflicts seemed 
missing from the gene pool. 
Irving’s ethics charges here were more serious and more 
directly impugning to I.T. than the Odom campaign donation. They 
led to administrative hearings and then additional, prolonged 
litigation involving I.T., Research Associates, and DNR personnel. 
                                                                                                             
 127. Id. The description that follows of the assistance of Mr. Givens, who has 
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 128. See supra text accompanying notes 47–50 (Research Associates 
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That case was ultimately decided before the Louisiana Supreme 
Court the very year the Save Ourselves case finished its legal 
journey before the same justices.131 I.T.’s contentions that it had no 
conflict of interest were found “unacceptable to the point of being 
ludicrous.”132  
The ethics ruling was limited in one key respect, however. The 
court decided that, ethics violations notwithstanding, it lacked the 
authority to void the contract.133 The Burnside tract, so far as I.T. 
was concerned, remained all systems go, which left it with just one 
remaining problem: Save Ourselves. 
VIII. THE LITIGATION BEGINS 
It was always going to come to a lawsuit. Irving knew better 
than anyone how prejudiced the ECC was against his client. He 
had seen it in the other waste cases, and these were the same 
players. His mission was to establish a record from which to appeal 
to the courts. In this effort, Irving, again, found two surprising 
allies, this time on the Commission itself. 
The first was George Fischer from the Department of Health 
whose agency had been handling waste issues until the l979 
reorganization transferred this authority to DNR and its Office of 
Environmental Affairs.134 Fisher, like Dale Givens in DNR, did not 
oppose the I.T. permit but he had reservations about the way it 
was, in effect, being railroaded. He told the press that he found 
Save Ourselves’s concerns “legitimate, primarily because the I.T. 
proposal contained so few details.135 “Too much had been left 
unexplained,” he went on, “and I just don’t believe the state had 
any business giving a permit to a firm which has not explained 
thoroughly what it intends to do.”136 Fisher went so far as to move 
the Commission to direct an independent study of the matter.137 
His motion lost, six votes to one, but each such proposal further 
tarnished the project and gained credibility for Save Ourselves. 
Irving’s second ally was George Kramer, the Department of 
Transportation representative on the ECC, who, being from an 
agency heavily engaged in construction across Louisiana, had 
                                                                                                             
 131. See I.T. Corp. v. Comm’n on Ethics for Pub. Emps., 464 So. 2d 284 (La. 
1985). 
 132. Id. at 257 (quoting findings of the Commission). 
 133. See I.T. Corp., 453 So. 2d at 259. 
 134. Irving Interview, supra note 36. 
 135. Pitts, supra note 33. 
 136. Id. at 1-6. 
 137. Id. 
432 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72 
 
 
 
access to geologists independent of DNR.138 Together, Irving and 
Kramer presented evidence to the Commission that there were 
three levels of aquifers below the Burnside site, two of which were 
hydraulically connected to the Mississippi River.139 This evidence 
was crucial. DNR’s own hazardous waste management plan, 
written by Research Associates, required waste sites to be isolated 
“by natural or by created barriers” from both subsurface and 
surface waters.140 Ironically, I.T. had called this isolation “one of 
the most important criteria” in site selection for a hazardous waste 
facility.141 When at this ECC hearing Kramer moved for adoption 
of his hydraulic connection data as a fact, and additional facts on 
subsurface contamination from unknown sources, Irving held his 
breath. Perhaps, he later reminisces, in order to “throw us a bone” 
the ECC granted the motion.142 At this point, he leaned over to 
Theresa Robert and whispered, “that killed the project.”143 
Not quite. The Commission voted to approve the permits with 
only one dissenting vote, attaching over two hundred findings of 
fact virtually all of which supported the project.144 These findings 
also, however, contained the Kramer findings about the site 
contamination and connection to the River.145 There they would 
lie, unperturbed as a buried waste drum until they were exhumed in 
court. Meanwhile, there were still three difficult appeals to go. 
The first two lost. I.T. successfully argued before the 19th 
Judicial District Court146 that Louisiana law prohibited a judge 
from overruling an administrative decision unless it contained 
“manifest error,”147 a high bar only slightly short of “completely 
                                                                                                             
 138. Irving Interview, supra note 36. 
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 140. Robert, supra note 20, at 3. 
 141. Save Ourselves v. La. Envtl. Control Comm’n, 430 So. 2d 1114, 1119 
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absurd.” The trial judge, obviously troubled by the record, found 
that the permit application was unlawfully incomplete but that in a 
Catch-22 for Irving, it became complete with evidence he had 
supplied during the proceedings.148 The First Circuit Court of 
Appeals agreed.149 A concurring judge, despite “misgivings” about 
the “dire consequences of error, accident or mismanagement,” 
wrote that to cast a negative vote “would constitute a substitution 
of my judgment for that of the Commissioners.”150 There was only 
one appeal left. 
Irving petitioned the Louisiana Supreme Court, whose decision 
even to accept the case was a crap shoot. Very few such writs are 
granted, and most are dismissed in summary fashion. The Save 
Ourselves writ was drawn to focus on what Irving saw to be the 
pivotal issue: that the ECC’s approval violated the state’s own plan 
requiring isolation from surface and subsurface waters.151 The only 
evidence in the record signaled connection instead. Neither Irving 
nor any other counsel in the case could have predicted the decision 
that followed. The case landed on the desk of a justice who saw a 
larger issue. 
IX. SAVE OURSELVES V. ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL COMMISSION 
The Supreme Court justices were troubled by the petition and 
held it for an unusual few weeks, trying to decide whether to 
accept or dismiss.152 Finally deciding to consider the matter, the lot 
for drafting an opinion fell to James Dennis. Justice Dennis had 
written related opinions and had also written more widely on the 
Louisiana public trust doctrine, under which the state managed 
natural resources for the benefit of the people.153 Dennis had been 
                                                                                                             
 
and substantial evidence on the whole record.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
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the kind of student who read Great Books of the World in law 
school simply to broaden his mind; he was also the kind of judge 
who read all the briefs and, often to the consternation of attorneys 
before him, did his own research and thinking as well. By 
coincidence, Dennis had been a delegate to the l974 state 
constitutional convention where he had participated in drafting the 
new provision for environmental protection. All of these strands, 
the constitutional amendment, the public trust doctrine, and an 
independent legal mind, would come to bear on his consideration 
of the Save Ourselves appeal. 
As would yet another circumstance. Dennis resided near Bayou 
Bonfouca in Slidell, Louisiana. An abandoned creosote plant left 
the bayou so contaminated that two Coast Guard divers, exploring 
the area, came up with second degree burns.154 A follow-up report 
by the Army Corps of Engineers found bottom sediments at seven 
to eight percent creosote—lethal doses.155 A neighborhood 
movement formed to have the creosote removed, and shortly 
thereafter, the St. Tammany Parish Policy Jury successfully 
petitioned the EPA to list Bonfouca as the thirteenth Superfund site 
in Louisiana.156 Dennis kept himself removed from the politics, but 
he was quite aware of the controversy.157 Toxic contamination was 
a serious problem. 
As Dennis read into the record of the Save Ourselves 
proceedings, he was struck by the same evidentiary anomalies that 
were apparent to the lower courts—the site was connected, and 
contaminated—but he also saw state duties here more broadly than 
the specifics of its hazardous waste management plan.158 Had he 
limited his analysis to the plan, had he overturned the I.T. permit 
for failure to follow it, the case would have been temporarily 
noteworthy and since forgotten. Instead, he turned to what he knew 
best, the constitution and the public trust. 
The opinion opens by identifying state public trust obligations 
dating back to the 1890s and captured by succeeding 
Constitutions.159 Environmental laws for hazardous waste 
management and establishing the ECC itself implemented these 
obligations to “maintain, protect and enhance a healthful and safe 
environment.”160 The result was a “constitutional-statutory” 
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scheme in which the state acted as trustee for all the people.161 The 
opinion then turned to the question of how it should do so.  
Dennis had little guidance on trustee duties for this new thing 
before him—environmental law.162 The briefs did not touch the 
subject. He began, then, to educate himself, as was his wont, by 
reading texts and seminal federal environmental opinions that had 
issued a decade earlier. The most analogous case he found was a 
recent decision of the federal appellate court in Washington, 
D.C.163 interpreting the nascent National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA).164 Dennis concluded that, as in that decision, government 
agencies had affirmative obligations to protect the public trust 
which went beyond evidence produced by the parties, in order to 
assure a proper decision.165 Like NEPA, the Louisiana trust did not 
require absolute protection in a given case, but it did require a 
rigorous “balancing process” in which agencies had room for “a 
responsible exercise of discretion.”166 Unstated, but implied, was 
the conclusion that an irresponsible exercise—such as negligence 
in examining major permits—was unlawful.167  
Applying this principle to the facts, Dennis found that the ECC 
failed to do its homework on the most critical issues of the case. It 
did not even investigate water wells on the property, much less 
close them. It did not explore whether the clay liner intended to 
seal off the aquifers below would decompose from the heat of the 
toxics. It did not require an additional slurry wall around the pit, 
having identified the need for one. It did not limit, or even 
calculate, the number of waste pits that would be allowed on the 
1000 acre property.168 On the record, it was also impossible to 
know what alternative methods, sites or mitigation methods were 
examined, nor how the Commission weighed their pros and 
cons.169 Under his analysis, Dennis did not have to decide whether 
the I.T. project violated the law. The Commission had violated the 
law instead. 
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There was no dissent. It was now 1984 and I.T. and the ECC 
would have to go back to the drawing board. 
X. LINGERING DEMISE 
No one knew what to do next. The ECC had no rules for a 
remand from the Supreme Court and was uncertain whether even 
to take new testimony or not.170 I.T., of course, insisted that all that 
was needed were new findings, better addressing the weak spots in 
the record, with which courts would then have to concur, because 
they involved factual matters within DNR’s expertise. Save 
Ourselves, of course, wanted to introduce additional evidence and 
to cross examine whatever the government or I.T. proffered; this 
was not in its opinion simply a question of faulty language but of 
fundamentally serious risks. The state, meanwhile, was under new 
management. Edwin Edwards had been elected to replace David 
Treen, but that did not necessarily signal the Governor’s support. 
Although Edwards had selected I.T., he was also closely allied to 
Jefferson Parish and its heavyweight political establishment. His 
Secretary of the newly formed DEQ, Patricia Norton, was, 
anomalously, an environmentalist.171 Stating that, “to me, it’s a 
whole new ball game,”172 she stalled. For two years, the matter 
went nowhere. 
Finally, in l986, Secretary Norton having been dismissed by 
Governor Edwards,173 new hearings were scheduled. But then 
came a new complication: the federal waste permit contained 
different engineering and documentation from the original 
application six years before. Both permits were ordered to be 
consolidated, forming an enormous mound of documents, fact and 
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law.174 The DEQ, new leadership notwithstanding, gave notice of 
75 deficiencies to be addressed.175 The process was becoming 
unmanageable. 
Another two years later the hearings finally came forward, 
before an administrative law judge who at one point confessed, 
“this is a case like no other. I think we’re making jurisprudence 
here.”176 It was a messy business. With new witnesses, evidence, 
and claims that I.T. intended to sell the site, that the original 
permits had expired, and that new conflicts of interest had arisen, 
he eventually wound his way to a recommendation to deny the 
permit.177 
The recommendation went to yet a new and different DEQ. By 
this time, Governor Edwards was out of office. Taking the helm at 
the Department was a well-known scientist from LSU, Dr. Paul 
Templet, who had been strongly endorsed by Louisiana 
environmental groups and chosen by the incoming Governor 
Roemer from a field of over 200 candidates.178 Templet, reviewing 
the record, saw no other option than to deny the permit. There were 
many factors for him, including impacts on minorities and the 
Houma Nation site, but the dominant one was the hydrological 
connection with the Mississippi River.179 “I didn’t think it could be 
fixed,” he said. “It wasn’t feasible, and they hadn’t proposed it—it 
wasn’t in the permit.”180 
At last, I.T. threw in the towel. Templet saw the result from a 
regulatory point of view. New and substantial hazardous waste fees 
had driven down the waste business by raising the costs of 
disposal. “Companies had begun to realize that creating waste is 
expensive,” and, with a nudge from the state, were “becoming 
more efficient in how they operate.”181 Irving offered a different 
reason.182 I.T. had started out in the hazardous waste cleanup 
business and only later spread, with chronic difficulty and 
controversy, into the waste disposal business. Now, bogged down 
in Louisiana by the Burnside waste plant proposal, it rediscovered 
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its roots. In September l982, a freight train derailed near the town 
of Livingston, Louisiana, a short drive from Burnside.183 It was a 
familiar Louisiana story; the engineer was apparently drunk and 
had turned over the engine controls to a female friend.184 More 
than 200,000 gallons of toxic wastes poured out onto and into the 
ground.185 I.T. was hired to remediate the mess for many millions 
of dollars. According to Irving, the lesson was obvious: there was 
more money to be made and far less headache in cleanup projects, 
which were never far away. Both men may have been right. 
At last, Save Ourselves could stand down. From the time Ruby 
Cointment had first called Theresa Robert in her trailer, one child 
on her hip and another crawling the floor, ten years had passed. 
Few days over that period of time went by without some new 
development on the issue, a call from the press, or even a threat of 
retaliation. At one point, when the hearings were getting heated, 
Theresa and Al Robert feared for their lives.186 Things happen in 
small rural communities, and this was a community torn between 
industry jobs and industry chemicals. Plant workers in the waste 
site corridor were told not to eat at The Cabin.187 At another 
juncture, playing good cop, I.T. offered to buy 200–300 lunches 
from the restaurant as an incentive for the Roberts to back away.188 
Neither gambit worked. After an early setback, Theresa rallied the 
troops saying, “they’ve led people to believe that they’re here to 
stay but they haven’t got a permit yet and they haven’t actually 
bought the land.”189 Ruby Cointment later told the press, “big 
business and big governments can often intimidate a man with a 
job, but they can never intimidate a woman with a child.”190 
In retrospect, Theresa Robert gives all the credit to Steve 
Irving. He had “an environmental background,” she says, and “a 
tremendous understanding of politics; and when you’d look at 
something technical, he just had an unbelievable mind. He could 
sit there and read it, and just absorb it.”191 Irving, in turn, credits 
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Theresa Robert.192 As does Templet: “Without Theresa, there 
would have been no I.T. decision. She pulled that group together, 
whatever resources she needed to file suit . . . that’s how 
democracy is supposed to work.”193 
All three may be right. 
XI. FALLOUT 
The outcome of Save Ourselves, however improbable, is not 
the reason why the case had such a seismic impact on the state 
bureaucracy, the petrochemical industry, community groups, and 
corporate law firms. To be sure, a large hazardous waste disposal 
operation that could have become a nation-wide magnet was 
canceled, but many things are canceled in life and we continue 
with our routines. What the Save Ourselves opinion did was 
change the routine. 
Following the decision, DEQ Secretary Templet applied its 
language in reaching his decision on the I.T. project, but did not 
reduce it to a formal process. That step came through a subsequent 
challenge to a solid waste permit by a neighboring landowner.194 In 
Blackett, a court of appeals interpreted Save Ourselves to require a 
five-step inquiry: the avoidance of impacts, a balancing analysis, 
and consideration of alternative projects, sites and mitigating 
conditions.195 Save Ourselves had announced the principle; 
Blackett spelled out the drill. A subsequent waste case went on to 
suggest a written basis for these decisions, summarizing the factors 
and the reasoning behind the agency’s choice.196 In the following 
years, courts expanded the “I.T.” process to virtually all DEQ 
actions and the actions of similar agencies including the DNR and 
the Department of Wildlife and Fisheries.197 
Not without controversy. For government functionaries, Save 
Ourselves’ requirements were a most unwelcome intrusion of the 
judiciary. From industry and development quarters, including 
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corporate law firms, came a storm of opprobrium: “infamous,” 
“overly burdensome,” and the imposition of “extra-legislative 
will.”198 What these criticisms overlooked is that Justice Dennis 
simply asked the state to justify its decision. Similar plants better 
planned and located to minimize risks have since passed the “I.T. 
test” with flying colors.199 
What the critics also overlooked is that Justice Dennis, in his 
decision, actually cut them considerable slack. The hazardous 
waste law under which the I.T. permit had been granted, and which 
Irving thought were his issue on appeal, required the state to 
“assure safe treatment, storage and disposal.”200 The word “assure” 
in English dictionaries means more than someone’s opinion; it puts 
the burden on the state to prove that risks are minimal. Justice 
Dennis, focusing on other law, let this language slip, reducing the 
law’s potentially heavy burden of proof to, in effect, a constitution-
based procedural review. The result was an opinion that reached 
more widely than the statute at hand, but with a lighter hand. 
We may leave these reactions to others, however, because in 
l997 state lawmakers bowed to the inevitable (Save Ourselves was, 
after all, decided on constitutional grounds) and enacted legislation 
requiring an amplified version of I.T. analysis for all DEQ 
hazardous waste and (major) pollution discharge permits.201 
Applicants would be required to prepare an “environmental review 
statement” that covered the I.T. principles, completing a 
conversation initiated by Justice Dennis ten years before.202 While 
the new law placed responsibility for the statement with the 
proponent—rarely a recipe for candor or full-disclosure—it also 
specified that agencies were not “relieved” from their “public trust 
requirements” under Article 9 of the Constitution. Going forward, 
DEQ would remain holding the bag.203 Many states, like the 
federal government, now make such reviews the backbone of their 
environmental policies.204 Perhaps because the idea is so sensible, 
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it has stood the test of time. Who in the world could object to 
looking at the impacts of what you are doing before doing it? Who 
could object to the public looking, too?205 
Government and industry could object when, as is quite 
common, they have a deal lined up in advance. They perceive 
themselves, with varying degrees of justification, as the experts, 
and the real offense of the I.T. requirements is that they give 
outsiders the right to question what they know. Worse, if the 
answers are not satisfactory, there may come a challenge in 
court.206 This ghost does not sortie out of the closet very often. 
Few individuals or environmental groups have the resources to 
take on the government and private industry; the case at hand took 
ten years of people’s lives. Save Ourselves did not usher in a flood 
of litigation. It hardly created a trickle. 
Nor did the I.T. requirements convert agency personnel and 
industry permit applicants to a new, greener way of doing business. 
In practice, DEQ and other state agencies have largely reduced the 
process to a checklist sloughed onto permit applicants, who, like 
Research Associates, Inc., are hardly objective about the impacts 
of their own proposals. Louisiana corporations, led by the oil, gas, 
and chemical industry, continue to perceive environmental policy 
as a nuisance,207 and Louisiana agencies continue to see these 
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of course, human and unavoidable. The proposition, however, that Louisiana 
DEQ, because of I.T. or any other requirement, favors the public over industry 
would find very few believers. 
 207. See the repeated attempts by the Louisiana Chemical Association to close 
the Tulane Environmental Law Clinic, which represents citizens and communities 
in the chemical corridor on pollution issues, in Adam Babich, Controversy, 
Conflicts, and Law School Clinics, 17 CLINICAL L. REV. 469 (2011). 
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corporations as their clients. Neighborhood and environmental 
groups are still “others” in the equation. We are still Louisiana. 
This said, the importance of the I.T. requirements—or any 
environmental law requirements for that matter—does not stem 
from lawsuits filed to enforce them but, rather, from the fact that 
such challenges are possible. It is this possibility, and the 
unpredictability of their outcome, that have a magical, 
straightening effect. The more one hides unpleasant facts and 
bends the law, the more vulnerable to an I.T., insufficient-
disclosure challenge a state permit becomes. On the other hand, the 
more one reveals about the knowns and unknowns of a dubious 
proposal, as the I.T. case itself demonstrates, the more its approval 
becomes suspect on the merits and body politic. The American 
experience is that disclosure can be powerful therapy. 
In the end, the Save Ourselves court did not decide whether I.T. 
could build the world’s largest hazardous waste facility on the 
Mississippi River at Burnside, Louisiana. It simply allowed 
affected Louisiana citizens to put the proposal to the test. At which 
point, the project failed. Today, the Burnside tract is occupied by a 
modest residential development called Pelican Point. Few pelicans 
travel this far up river, but no one is complaining. 
 
 
